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Abstract
In this paper we aim to find a measure for the diver-
sity of cash flows between agents in an economy. We
argue that cash flows can be linked to probabilities
of finding a currency unit in a given cash flow. We
then use the information entropy as a natural mea-
sure of diversity. This leads to a hirarchical inequality
measure, which includes the well-known Theil index
as a special case, and a constraint on agent entropy
differentials, i.e., the difference between cash inflow
and outflow entropies. The last result is particularly
intriguing as it formalises the fact that an economy
must contain both, cash flow aggregating and cash
flow diversifying agents.
1 Introduction
Most people, when inspecting their bank account
statement, could make the following observation:
while inflows tend to come in a few large payments
(salary etc), outflows are much more dispersed (daily
groceries, rent, monthly bills, etc). By considering
the sources, destinations and relative sizes of the pay-
ments, it is possible to write down the probability of
where a dollar of an agent’s income came from and
where it is going. With this we can describe the differ-
ence between the large inflows and dispersed outflows
in terms of the entropy of these probabilities.
Let us assume an economy in which no money is
created or destroyed and in which, over a period,
cash flows only occur between a set of discrete agents.
Such an economy can clearly not exist if every agent’s
cash flow situation is as above — few large inflows
and many small outflows. There must be agents who
collect small cash flows and pay out large sums. Ex-
amples which come to mind are generally companies,
for example selling a mass produced product (small
cash flows) and buying supplies and services in bulk
(large payments).
This hints at the idea that the entropies of the
inflow and outflow probabilities of all the agents in
the economy must be related in some way.
This paper will be structured as follows: In Section
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2 we formalize the cash flow-probability relationship
and introduce information entropy to measure diver-
sity. In Section 3 we examine the results for the
simpler case of a steady-state economy. Section 4
contains examples for the two and three agent cases.
This is followed by the Conclusion in Section 5. In the
appendix we derive the information entropy subdivi-
sion property for the case of 2/3 possible outcomes.
2 Cash flows and probabilities
Let us assume that in an economy cash flows occur
over a period of time between N agents. Let cjk rep-
resent the cash flow from agent j to agent k. This
can be conviniently represented in a cash flow matrix,
where each row corresponds to a source agent (upper
index) and each column to a destination agent (lower
index)  c
1
1 · · · c1N
...
...
cN1 · · · cNN
 (1)
With cash flow cjk we can then associate a probability
pjk
def
=
cjk∑
k,j c
j
k
. (2)
which represents the likelihood that a random cur-
rency unit in the economy would have been part
of cash flow cjk (which assumes identifiable currency
units). Note that “saving” would correspond to a
cashflow cjj from an agent j to himself.
To measure the diversity of all cash flows in the
economy we will use the information entropy
H
def
= −
∑
j,k
pjk log2(p
j
k), (3)
which is measured in bits (due to the choice of 2 as
the base of the logarithm). To simplify the notation
let us extend this definition to “un-normalized” prob-
abilities by defining a new function
K(x1, . . . , xn)
def
= H
(
x1∑
i xi
, . . . ,
xn∑
i xi
)
. (4)
An intriguing property of the information entropy
is how it respects the grouping of possible outcomes.
Lets say we group the N possible outcomes into n <
N groups. The overall entropy can then be written
as
H = Hg +
∑
j
pjHj , (5)
where pj is the probability of the outcome being in
group j, Hj is the “internal entropy” of group j (en-
tropy of the probabilities conditional on the fact that
the outcome was in group j), and
Hg
def
= −
∑
j
pj log2 pj (6)
is the information entropy for the aggregate groups.
By applying above identity recursively to the prob-
abilities corresponding to all possible cash flows one
obtains a hirarchical set of inequality/diversity mea-
sures.
As a first step let us put all savings cii in one group,
and all remaining cash flows in another group. Using
above identity we find
H = H{sc} + p{s}H{s} + p{c}H{c}, (7)
where p{s}
def
=
∑
i p
i
i and p{c} = 1−p{s} are the aggre-
gate probability of a currency unit being in a “saving
cash flow” and inter-agent cash flow respectively,
H{sc}
def
= −p{s} log2(p{s})− p{c} log2(p{s}) (8)
is a measure of diverisification between savings and
spending,
H{s}
def
= K(c11, . . . , c
N
N ) (9)
is a measure of the saving diversity in the economy
(it is highest when all agents have the same saving),
and
H{c}
def
= K(c12, . . . , c
n
n−1) (10)
is a measure of diversity for all inter-agent cash flows.
Cash flows can now be grouped by their origin
or destination. We define the aggregated cash flows
from agent j and to agent k excluding savings as
cj
def
=
∑
k,k 6=j
cjk ck
def
=
∑
j,j 6=k
cjk. (11)
2
The probabilities of finding a currency unit (which
is not a saving) in the cash-out/in flows of an agent
are
pj =
cj∑
i c
i
pk =
ck∑
l cl
(12)
We can now define probabilities similar to above,
but within one of the cash flow groups to or from an
agent for j 6= k
p
(j)
k =
cjk
cj
(1− δjk) pj(k) =
cjk
ck
(1− δjk). (13)
This is the probability to find an arbitrary currency
unit leaving/going to agent j in a cash flow to/from
agent k. Evidently∑
k
p
(j)
k = 1
∑
j
pj(k) = 1 (14)
By grouping the cash flow by the originating agent
(upper index) we find
H{c} = H ′ +
∑
j
pjHj , (15)
where
H ′ def= −
∑
j
pj log2(p
j) (16)
is the entropy of the aggregate agent cash out-flow
probabilities pj and
Hj
def
= −
∑
k
p
(j)
k log2(p
(j)
k ) (17)
is the entropy of each agents cash outflows, i.e., the
entropy of p
(j)
k for fixed j. It is maximized if all cash
flows from the agent are equal, and minimized (in
which case it is zero) if there is only a single cash flow
from agent j. Hence this is a measure of spending
diversity for agent j.
Similarly this can be done for cash in-flows
H{c} = H ′′ +
∑
k
pkHk, (18)
where H ′′ is the entropy of the aggregate agent cash
in-flow probabilities pk and Hk is the entropy of the
pj(k) for fixed k. Here similarly to above
H ′′ def= −
∑
k
pk log2(pk) (19)
Hk
def
= −
∑
j
pj(k) log2(p
j
(k)). (20)
Taking the sum and difference of the two expres-
sions for H{c} we find
H{c} =
H ′ +H ′′
2
+
1
2
∑
j
(pjHj + p
jHj) (21)
0 =
H ′′ −H ′
2
+
∑
j
(pjHj − pjHj) (22)
The last equation is particularly interesting as it re-
lates the difference of overall income and spending
inequality to individual agents cash flow diversifica-
tion.
3 The Steady State Economy
Cash flows to and from agents over the period are
related by
[c1 · · · cN ]

p
(1)
1 · · · p(1)N
...
...
p
(N)
1 · · · p(N)N
 = [c1 · · · cN ] (23)
For a stationary wealth distribution we need cj =
cj and hence
pj = p
j . (24)
Assuming stationarity and dividing above equation
by the sum of all cash flows gives
[p1 · · · pN ]

p
(1)
1 · · · p(1)N
...
...
p
(N)
1 · · · p(N)N
 = [p1 · · · pN ] (25)
In the case of stationarity we have H¯
def
= H ′ = H ′′
and expression 21 becomes
H = H¯ +
1
2
∑
j
pj(Hj +H
j), (26)
which shows how the overall entropy splits into an
inter-agent component H¯ and an internal component
3
for each agent
Hj+H
j
2 . We suggest that H¯ is a mea-
sure of income inequality as it measures the diversity
of incomes. However, H¯ includes contributions from
all agents, including non-human agents like corpora-
tions and government. Using the same identity as
above one can express H¯ in terms of agent groups,
for example
H¯ = H∗ + p∗GH
∗
G + p
∗
CH
∗
C + p
∗
PH
∗
P , (27)
where H∗P measures the income distribution between
human individuals and can be recognized as related
to the Theil index of income inequality [2]. H∗G and
H∗C are similar measures for government and corpo-
rates. H∗ then measures the inequality between the
sectors in the economy. It is well know that these
properties of the information entropy make it a suit-
able inequality measure [3].
Similarly (22) simplifies to
0 =
∑
j
pj(Hj −Hj), (28)
which says that the probability weighted sum of the
difference of agent inflow and outflow entropy van-
ishes. This equation is interesting as it shows how
the entropy differentials between agent in and out
flows have to balance in the economy.
For the agent in the economy labelled j, the en-
tropy Hj represents the uncertainty of which source
a dollar of j’s came from. Similarly, the entropy Hj
is the uncertainty of where a dollar of j’s payments
will go. The difference (Hj − Hj) is, therefore, the
difference of uncertainty between the inflow and out-
flow probabilities. If the difference is positive, then
an agent will be more uncertain about where an in-
flow dollar came from than where an outflow dollar is
going. If the difference is negative then the opposite
will be true.
Since the probabilities pj in (28) are all positive, it
is not possible for all agents to have a positive entropy
difference or all to have a negative entropy difference.
Some agents must be more certain about where their
next dollar will come from relative to where it is going
and other agents must be more certain about where
their next dollar is going than where it came from.
Typically, the former could be an individual (often
the whole income comes in the form of a single salary
payment) while the latter could be a store or service
provider (many customers pay for goods while the
payments will go to few suppliers).
4 Examples
4.1 The two-agent economy
This is the simplest possible, but somewhat restricted
case. Let us define the matrix of cash flows
C
def
=
[
c11 c
1
2
c21 c
2
2
]
(29)
Note that there is the freedom to rescale the cash
flows by a constant factor. For stationarity we require
c12 = c
2
1. (30)
With
~u
def
=
[
1
1
]
(31)
we have [
c1
c2
]
= C~u (32)[
p1
p2
]
=
C~u
~u′C~u
(33)[
p
(i)
1 p
(i)
2
]
=
[
ci1 c
i
2
]
/(ci1 + c
i
2) (34)
From these all the entropies of interest (H ′, Hj and
Hj) can be calculated.
Let us scale the cashflows such that c12 = c
2
1 = 1,
i.e., the savings are measured relative to the inter-
agent cashflows. The cashflow matrix then takes the
form
C
def
=
[
a 1
1 b
]
, (35)
where a and b are non-negative numbers. We then
have
p{c} =
2
2 + a+ b
p{s} = 1− p{c} (36)
H{s} = K(a, b) H{c} = 1 (37)
Figures 1 to 4 illustrate probabilities and entropies
for this case.
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Figure 1: Heat-map of p{s} for the 2-agent case.
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Figure 2: Heat-map of H{s} for the 2-agent case.
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Figure 3: Heat-map of H{sc} for the 2-agent case.
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Figure 4: Heat-map of the overall cash-flow entropy
H for the 2-agent case. The previous plots are a
decomposition of this entropy. We have H = H{sc}+
pH{s} + p{c}H{c}.
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4.2 The three-agent economy
Let us assume stationarity and no savings. The cash-
flow matrix is then 0 c12 c13c21 0 c23
c31 c
3
2 0
 (38)
There are two constraints resulting from the station-
arity requirement
c1 = c1 c
2 = c2 (39)
(this implies c3 = c3) and one freedom to “choose the
cash denomination” (allowing us to re-scale all values
in the cash-flow matrix).
Let us choose the normalization such that the av-
erage agent income/spending is 1, i.e.,
c1 + c2 + c3 = 3. (40)
Furthermore, let us choose the following three param-
eters for the cash flow matrix
c12
c1
= a
c23
c2
= b
c31
c3
= k. (41)
Then the definition of cj implies
c13
c1
= 1− a c
2
1
c2
= 1− b c
3
2
c3
= 1− k. (42)
Writing down the definitions for c1, c2 and the mean
constraint as a linear system in the cj gives c1c2
3
 =
 0 1− b ka 0 1− k
1 1 1
 c1c2
c3
 (43)
and hence  c1c2
c3
 = B−1
 00
3
 , (44)
where
B =
 −1 1− b ka −1 1− k
1 1 1
 (45)
The overall entropy (which is equal toH{c} because
we excluded savings here) for different values of k is
presented in the heat plots 5 and 6.
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Figure 5: Heat-map of the overall cash-flow entropy
H for the 3-agent case with k = 0.3.
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Figure 6: Heat-map of the overall cash-flow entropy
H for the 3-agent case with k = 0.5.
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To illustrate the identity (28) let us assume a spe-
cific case, by fixing the parameters for the cash flow
matrix to
a = 0.1 b = 0.3 k = 0.7. (46)
This corresponds to the cash flow matrix 0 0.1235 1.11180.3516 0 0.1507
0.8837 0.3787 0
 (47)
The inflow entropies (entropies in each column) are
then
H1 = 0.8617; H2 = 0.8048; H3 = 0.5275 (48)
while the outflow entropies (entropies in each row)
are then
H1 = 0.4690; H2 = 0.8813; H3 = 0.8813. (49)
Let us define the entropy differentials (inflow minus
outflow entropy) Dj
def
= Hj −Hj
D1 = 0.3927; D2 = −0.0765; D3 = −0.3538
(50)
We see that agent 1 is an entropy reducer, while agent
3 is an entropy increaser. Agent 2 is almost entropy
neutral. From the cash flow matrix we find the pj as
p1 = 0.4118; p2 = 0.1674; p3 = 0.4208. (51)
Now it is easy to verify that the identity (28) is satis-
fied. This means that the weighted entropy differen-
tials for any two agents imply the weighted entropy
differential for the remaining agent.
5 Conclusion
We presented a formalism linking cash flows to an
entropy measure. The measure naturally adopts to
sub-goupings of the cash flows and as such produces
a number of inequality measures, one of them being
the Theil Index.
While the Theil Index is well know, we believe the
over all framework we presented is new. It produces
inequality measures between all possible groupings
of agents and internal inequality measures for each
group.
Another interesting result is a kind of overall en-
tropy balance expressed in equation (22) and (28).
This essentially says that there must be a balance
between entropy increasers (receiving few large cash
flow, making many small payments) and decreasers
(receiving many small payments and making a few
large payments). Whether this can be linked to an
“economic energy” is an interesting question which
we have not yet addressed. However, one might spec-
ulate that entropy increasers (consumers) tend to
pay the profit margins received by entropy decreasers
(companies).
The formalism presented here does not allow for
credit, which is obviously an important factor in the
real world. We believe that credit can be incorpo-
rated in the formalism and this will be the subject of
further research.
Another possible extension is an inclusion of time
so that entropy cannot just be measured over one
time step, but also over a number of time steps. One
way of doing this is to consider discrete times and to
treat the same agent at different times as ’different’.
This should lead to entropies for payment profiles
over time, for example for loans repayed in install-
ments. We hope to be able to explore this more in a
seperate paper.
A Subdivision Identity Exam-
ple
Let us assume that we have 2 possible outcomes la-
beled by 1 and 2 with probabilities p1 and p2 = 1−p1.
The information entropy is then
H = −p1 log(p1)− p2 log(p2). (52)
Now let outcome 2 be the combination of two possible
outcomes 21 and 22 with probabilities p21 and p22
such that p2 = p21 + p22. We then find for the over-
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all entropy
H = −p1 log(p1)− p21 log(p21)− p22 log(p22)
= −p1 log(p1)
−p21 log
(
p2
p21
p2
)
− p22 log
(
p2
p22
p2
)
= −p1 log(p1)− p2 log(p2)
+p2
[
−p21
p2
log
(
p21
p2
)
− p22
p2
log
(
p22
p2
)]
The first two terms are the information entropy for
outcome 1 and the aggregate outcome 2. The second
term then adds the internal information entropy re-
sulting from the sub-division of outcome 2, which is
the weighted information entropy of the probabilities
conditional on the knowledge that outcome 2 is true.
Above derivation can be generalized in an obvious
way to arrive at (5).
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